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BRUNO: MODERN EUROPE’S FIRST FREE THINKER 
 
By Edward Jayne 
 
  
 By most accounts Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) was by far the most 
controversial Renaissance philosopher. He published at least sixty texts 
upon a large variety of topics including mnemonics, hermetic religion, 
Copernican astronomy, and the renewed possibility of materialism as 
suggested by this major breakthrough in astronomy.  For the most part his 
notoriety resulted from his defense of heliocentric theory, but also from his 
pursuit of its theoretical implications toward a modern renewal of ancient 
secular philosophy.  Just as Bacon bridged the gap between Aristotelian 
philosophy and modern science, Bruno no less effectively served the same 
purpose between ancient and modern secularism as justified by science.  
Particularly important in his opinion was Lucretius’ version of materialism 
based on the earlier assumptions of Aristotle and Epicurus. Bruno’s effort 
to encourage such a revival was best illustrated by his publications during 
two relatively brief periods--in 1584-85 while he lived in London and to a 
lesser extent while in Frankfurt in 1590-91. His reputation at the time was 
as an overbold iconoclast, but in fact his theoretical innovations derivative 
of classical secularism eventually set the stage for Spinoza’s pantheism in 
the mid-seventeenth century, followed by Leibniz’s philosophy as well as 
the versions of deism suggested by Toland, Meslier, Voltaire, and 
d’Holbach throughout the eighteenth century, and still later the materialist 
perspective of scientists and secularists in general that has come to 
predominate since the mid-nineteenth century.  
 
 In retrospect it seems to have been Bruno alone among modern 
secularists--i.e., those following the Dark and Middle Ages--who paid the 
ultimate price for his supposed audacity.  Captured in Italy, he underwent 
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seven years of relentless interrogation by the Roman Inquisition and was 
finally burned at the stake within sight of the Vatican. An image of Christ 
was supposedly shown to him preceding his death, but “he angrily rejected 
it with averted face. Today his heliocentric assumptions are mostly 
conceded, and orthodox Christian apologists have instead featured his 
pursuit of hermetic philosophy in an effort to reunite Catholic and 
Protestant denominations. Toward such a possibility, he seems to have 
accepted the assignment as an unofficial emissary from King Henry III of 
France to Queen Elizabeth of England in the effort to obtain a truce 
between the two nations based on arguments that must have seemed 
outright heresy at the time. Unfortunately, the records of his interrogation 
by the Inquisition have been lost or destroyed, so the primary charges 
against him otherwise remain uncertain. More recently theological 
apologists seem to find his heliocentric perspective less offensive than his 
effort to restore secular philosophy as a credible explanation of a material 
universe devoid of anthropomorphic godhood.  Since the fourth century, 
A.D., Christian metaphysics had featured philosophy as a secular defense 
of Christian faith in a flat universe, but all of a sudden Bruno’s cosmology 
presented itself in light of Copernican astronomy first suggested by the 
concepts of Anaximander and others many centuries earlier.  To this extent, 
at least, Bruno can be said to have restored the feasibility of ancient 
materialism once again. This could only have posed a major threat to 
received Biblical veracity, hence the necessity of the unforgettable auto da 
fé—of course within sight of the Vatican. 
 
 Bruno’s philosophical writings have been justly criticized with some 
justification for his authorial carelessness.  As late as the mid-nineteenth 
century Hegel disparaged his seeming inability to carry an idea forward: “. 
. . in the evolution of his thoughts [Bruno] never . . . advanced very much 
nor attained to any results.” [FN. vol. 3, 121-22]  However, Hegel’s 
assessment seems unduly harsh in light of Bruno’s many remarkable 
insights, at least a few of which seem to have been useful to Hegel himself.  
Not the least, for example, was Bruno’s simple but undeniable theory of 
dialectics that anticipated Hegel’s more inclusive “unity of opposites.” [FN. 
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“Concerning the Cause,” pp. 171-73] Bruno’s immediate source was 
probably Nicholas of Cusa, who had been in turn inspired by pre-Socratic 
philosophers such as Anaximander and Heraclitus.  Just as Nicholas of 
Cusa offered a scholastic model of dialectics, Bruno offered his own version 
of a more viable secular explanation, thereby bridging the gap between the 
ancient notion of causation and Hegel’s later and more advanced paradigm 
that anticipated the still later theories of Marx, Freud, and others in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hegel accordingly conceded to his 
credit, “But the leading characteristic of [Bruno’s] various writings is really 
to some extent the grand enthusiasm of a noble soul . . . and that “there is 
something bacchantic in his way of apprehending this deep 
consciousness.” As a result, he declared, Bruno “rose to the one universal 
substantiality by putting an end to this separation of self-consciousness and 
nature.” [ibid.]  In fact this synthesis praised by Hegel was implicit 
throughout Bruno’s major works.  
 
 As justification for Bruno’s lack of organization, his sustained role as 
a habitual fugitive in flight from one temporary haven to the next limited 
the possibility of careful scholarship that most academic authors depend on 
before submitting their ideas to the judgment of others. He was always on 
the move from one relatively enlightened town to the next, and this 
necessity could only have abridged his otherwise thorough scholarship.  
Offsetting this limitation, he benefitted from his quick intelligence, an 
exceptional memory, and a ready willingness to debate issues, even it 
seems during his interrogation by the Inquisition, when he was said to 
have challenged his inquisitors to recruit anybody they wanted to argue 
with him the merits of their accusations.   
 
 Then again, Bruno was also remarkably eclectic.  Early in his career 
he rejected Aristotle’s dominant influence important to Aquinas in favor of 
what might have seemed an improbable synthesis between Lucretius’ 
materialism and Plotinus’s Neoplatonism.  Bruno also drew on the ideas of 
such overlooked medieval figures as the fifteenth century alchemist 
Raimon Lull and the eleventh century Jewish poet and philosopher, 
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Avicebron (also identified as Ibn Gabirol).  Finally, Bruno also seems to 
have been on friendly terms with the professor, G.V. de Colle, known for 
his impious Averroist tendencies, and with Francisco Sanches, his 
colleague at Toulouse, whose theory of science also anticipated and 
perhaps helped to inspire Bacon’s science.  
     
 Unfortunately, Hegel’s benevolent condescension has prevailed 
among modern philosophers, who seldom take Bruno’s historical 
contribution seriously beyond his martyrdom by the church. Both Lange’s 
History of Materialism, published in 1865, and Bertrand Russell’s influential 
History of Philosophy, published in 1945, made no reference whatsoever to 
his theoretical contribution. On the other hand, Dame Frances Yates in her 
book, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (1964) as well as her 
biographical piece in the authoritative Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), 
initiated the modern emphasis on what seemed Bruno’s effort to obtain a 
hermetic gnosis of “Egyptianized Christianity” that might help to reconcile 
Catholicism with Protestantism and thus France with England.  In her 
influential research, however valid, her findings helped to deflect twentieth 
century scholarship from Bruno’s more important contribution as a secular 
materialist.  
 
 Born and raised near Naples, Bruno entered the Dominican Order at 
the age of 15, and at the age of 24 he began his career in Naples as an 
ordained priest committed to the teachings of Aquinas. He spent roughly a 
decade in this position without incident, but his viewpoint gradually 
altered as the result of his exposure to a wide variety of ancient and 
modern texts.  In 1576 he was charged with heresy for Arian tendencies, his 
mounting doubts about the Christian version of Aristotelian assumptions, 
and what seemed an undue interest in Erasmus’s Protestant viewpoint.  He 
therefore fled first to Rome, then to Venice, Padua, Milan, and finally 
Geneva, where he seems to have converted to Calvinism.  Soon, however, 
difficulties with the local church necessitated his flight to Toulouse, where 
he stayed long enough to obtain a doctorate in theology. Next he traveled 
to Paris and ingratiated himself with King Henry III largely because of his 
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ability to teach mnemonic skills additional to his proposed solution to 
reunite Protestantism and Catholicism.  Bruno also wrote a play and taught 
theology as well as the cultivation of mnemonics at the Palace Academy. 
Perhaps most important of all, he became acquainted with Pontus de 
Tyard, author of both Discours philosophiques and a flawed translation of 
Copernicus.  Bruno’s later commitment to the defense of Copernicus seems 
have begun with his exposure to this translation.  
 
 In 1583 Bruno traveled to England, where he lived in relative security 
for two years (1583-85).  The language barrier turned out to be an asset, 
since he continued to write his books in Italian, limiting his sympathetic 
English audience to a small aristocratic circle of admirers, possibly 
including Queen Elizabeth, to whom he seems to have dedicated his first 
Dialogue.   Meanwhile, English courts could hardly punish him for 
philosophical issues expressed in a foreign tongue many of them could not 
understand and that seemed at the time to be more offensive to Catholic 
than Protestant critics.  On the other hand, Italian authorities could not 
prosecute Bruno as long as he lived beyond their reach in a hostile 
Protestant nation.  The product of Bruno’s temporary liberation on this 
basis from both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy was a hasty but brilliant 
assortment of four overlapping theoretical works published as dialogues.  
Unfortunately, these remarkable books have been all but forgotten in more 
recent centuries despite their unique success in having provided 
materialism with a viable metaphysics of its own on an early modern basis.  
Bruno’s martyrdom in defense of Copernican astronomy has been famous 
since the sixteenth century, but few have bothered to acquaint themselves 
with his writings well enough to be aware of this seeming paradox offered 
by Bruno—a defensible philosophy rooted in materialism. 
   
 Bruno’s stay in England began with what might have seemed a 
professional catastrophe.  In the spring of 1583, his Oxford lecture upon 
Copernicus degenerated into a rancorous debate with orthodox Christian 
Aristotelian apologists on the local faculty, and it seems likely that this 
standoff provoked his four book-length dialogues that followed relevant to 
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the issue.  Bruno’s disdain for England’s academic failings aggravated by 
this incident is obvious throughout his first dialogue, which abounds with 
satire not to be found in his later dialogues.  However, the heliocentric 
information in his first dialogue raised as many questions as it answered in 
its explanation of Copernican astronomy, necessitating further clarification 
in at least two of the three additional dialogues that followed in the same 
year.  Fortunately, Bruno retained his friendship with eminent Englishmen 
such as Sidney, Raleigh, Fulke Greville, and the Earl of Leicester for most 
of the rest of his stay in England, giving him the freedom and opportunity 
to persist in his writings.  
 
 Bruno’s first English Dialogue, La Cena de le ceneri (translated by 
Edward Gosselin and Lawrence Lerner as The Ash Wednesday Supper—
hereafter cited as La Cena), was in fact the second defense of Copernican 
astronomy to be published in England at the time.  In 1576, eight years 
earlier, Thomas Digges’ had provided a sympathetic explanation of 
Copernicus in an appendix to his partial translation, A Perfit Description of 
the Caelestiall Orbes, etc.  Digges also proposed an infinite universe with 
countless stars first suggested by the Greek philosopher Melissus, and 
Bruno took up his thesis by proposing many additional considerations of 
his own relevant to astronomy as well as materialist philosophy.  In and of 
itself, his version of Copernican theory turned out to be remarkably 
insightful.  Even his most extravagant supposition, that planets elsewhere 
might host comparable biological populations, has become a subject of 
recent modern astronomical research.  
   
 Bruno organized La Cena as a sequence of five subordinate dialogues 
with the final three located at the mansion of Fulke Greville, where Bruno 
in the guise of Nolan debated against Nundinio and Torquato, who were 
apparently mocking depictions of his principal attackers at Oxford in their 
notorious debate just a few months earlier.  Bruno’s hostile satire cannot be 
ignored, but his more basic purpose was to spell out the principles that he 
felt deserved to be heard.  As he declared on p. 89 of La Cena, his intention 
in writing the book was not satiric, but-- 
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. . . to “free the human mind [since] it could not free itself from the 
chimeras of those who coming forth with manifold imposture from 
the mire and pits of the earth . . . have filled the whole world with 
infinite folly, nonsense and vice, disguised as so much virtue, 
divinity and discipline.” [FN] 
 
His inclusion of the word “divinity” linked with folly, nonsense, and vice 
made his anti-clerical intentions plain to all.  Bruno went on to emphasize 
this “manifold imposture” as the primary obstacle to the recovery of 
ancient wisdom after a period of collective darkness, and he declared his 
preference for secular freedom as compared to the constraints of received 
orthodox belief.  His idealized list of ancient virtues as compared to 
modern vulgarity helped to explain his preference: 
 
Now let us see the difference between the former and the latter 
[between ancient philosophers and the modern alternative].  The 
former are moderate in life, expert in medicine, judicious in 
contemplation, unique in divination, miraculous in magic, wary of 
superstition, law-abiding, irreproachable in morality, godlike in 
theology, and their lives, their healthier bodies, their most lofty 
inventions, etc. . . . I leave to the judgment of anyone of good sense 
the consideration of the fruits of the latter [i.e., the modern 
alternative]. [Ibid.] 
   
To help clarify this distinction, Bruno suggested the analogy between 
history and the diurnal cycle from day to night and back again to illustrate 
the advance from ancient civilization to Europe’s Dark and Middle Ages 
followed by the likelihood of recovery to a new period of enlightenment.  
In his opinion it seemed time for civilization to revive in all its perceived 
glory a modern renaissance: “. . . Are we, who make a beginning of the 
renewal of the ancient philosophy, in the morning which makes an end to 
the night, or are we rather in the evening which ends the day?” [p. 96] By 
“renewal,” of course, Bruno suggested rebirth, or renaissance, and in fact 
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he can be seen in retrospect as having expressed this insight at the very 
cusp of this transition.  
 
 Bruno was uncertain whether the Renaissance would sustain its 
positive momentum or would decline again into what seemed a period of 
reaction later identified as the Reformation, thereby postponing any full 
recovery to a later generation.  It cannot be forgotten that Bruno made this 
assessment sixty-seven years after Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to 
the Wittenberg castle church door and sixty-two years before the Treaty of 
Westphalia that terminated the Thirty Years’ War and arguably the entire 
Reformation as well.  In effect, medieval oppression had already given way 
to the Renaissance only to reassert itself in a new and equally threatening 
after-effect dominated by hostility between the Protestant Reformation and 
Catholic Counter-Reformation in their respective struggles against heresy. 
There were still decades to go before the worst ravages of this cooperative 
effort were eliminated.  Witches were still being burned at the stake in 
great numbers, and with the blessings of the established church in both its 
versions at the time. 
   
 In his third dialogue of la Cena, Bruno listed ancient predecessors 
who had already conceded the possibility of the earth’s motion, including 
Niceta Syracusus, Philolaus, Heraclitus of Pontus, Hecphantus the 
Pythagorean, Cusanus, and even Plato at least tentatively in Timaeus.  
Bruno also declared that the universe is infinite in full accord with 
Lucretius as well as Melissus and Epicurus’ declaration even earlier that 
nature is boundless, consisting of “infinite worlds both like and unlike the 
world of ours.” [FN Diogenes Laertius, II, 569-74]  A century before Bruno, 
Nicholas of Cusa apparently took such a possibility into account from a 
Christian perspective, and Bruno renewed its consideration relevant to 
Copernicus’ heliocentric assumptions if without any idea of the full extent 
of the universe as determined by modern astronomy—perhaps as many as 
two hundred billion stars in our particular galaxy identified as the Milky 
Way, which in turn is included in a more inclusive plenum (described as a  
“multiverse”) with at least two hundred billion other galaxies composing 
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the presently “known” universe.  Bruno was fully aware of enlarged 
possibilities, if not to this extreme, as opposed to the majority of church 
apologists, who apparently did not have the slightest idea.  
 
 Bruno also borrowed from both Melissus and Lucretius the theory 
that there is no center to the infinite universe as well as suggesting his own 
supposition that stars are farther away from each other than the earth is 
from the sun, and that universal motion occurs including the earth’s 
rotation and revolution around the sun.  Bruno conceded that the earth’s 
actual path through space is unique unto itself, but argued that the earth 
has the same composition as other worlds, and that living creatures might 
accordingly inhabit these other worlds. Of course all these assumptions 
were sacrilegious at the time, and in fact it was not until 1822 that the 
simplest principles of heliocentric theory were eliminated from the list of 
heresies in the Index of the Roman Catholic Church.  
 
 In his fourth dialogue Bruno once again declared the existence of an 
“immense ethereal region.”  He also differentiated warm from cold 
celestial bodies (i.e. stars and planets) and orbital from non-orbital celestial 
bodies (i.e. planets and comets), and he argued in accord with Copernicus 
that the earth both rotates on its own axis and revolves around the sun. 
Finally, in his Fifth Dialogue Bruno stressed the importance of gravity as 
opposed to levity (i.e. thrust resistant to gravity), as well as insisting that 
the earth is finally no different from other celestial bodies.  He included 
stars among celestial bodies in motion, and speculated that the sun itself 
rotates like the earth--as in fact it does over a 28-day period.  Bruno seems 
to have been the first suggestion of such a possibility in the entire history of 
ancient and modern astronomy.  He also maintained the defensible thesis 
that the sun is the only source of vital force on earth.   
 
 Most significant of all, Bruno proposed in his fifth and final dialogue 
of La Cena the heretical possibility that the coexistence of spatial infinitude 
with a deity in possession of infinite authority might justify a pantheistic 
equation between God with the universe itself.  In other words, the two 
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might be exactly the same. In effect, both celestial entities are infinite and 
thus necessarily overlap to this extent, and if each is truly infinite, are they 
not necessarily identical?  Of course this was heresy, and once articulated 
with sufficient clarity, it could be challenged on this basis.  Up to this point 
in la Cena, astronomical considerations were Bruno’s principal issue, but 
here, offered as a parting thought, the most basic metaphysical issues 
suddenly came to the fore again relevant to the identity and function of an 
infinite God confronted with an infinite universe.  Bruno avoided spelling 
out such a potential contradiction in plain sentences, but his loose grammar 
and blatant opacity seem to have been deliberate.  In its entirety the 
passage reads as follows: 
 
Now Heraclitus, Epicurus, Pythagoras, Parmenides and Melissus 
understood this point concerning bodies in the ethereal region, as the 
fragments we possess make manifest to us.  In [these fragments] one 
can see that they [the philosophers mentioned above] recognized an 
infinite space, an infinite region, infinite matter, an infinite capacity 
for innumerable worlds similar to this one, rounding their circles as 
the earth rounds its own. . . .  These mobile bodies possess the 
principle of intrinsic motion [through] their own natures, their own 
souls, their own intelligence.” [p. 206] 
 
Bruno’s implication was plain that the concept of the universe as “an 
infinite space, an infinite region, infinite matter, and an infinite capacity for 
innumerable worlds similar to this one” justifies comparison with the 
infinitude of God, as in fact the universe provides a “constitution of nature, 
the living mirror of the Infinite Deity.” Effectively the two are the same as 
later insisted by a variety of sympathetic pantheists. Bruno also featured 
the similarity and difference between the ancient concept of ethera—or pure 
air featured by ancient Greek philosophers--and an assortment of relatively 
minor supernatural agents featured as “nuncios” [i.e. messengers] of God 
with intrinsic powers of their own.  He concluded his analogy by 
mentioning the Pythagorean resemblance between the unique identity of 
God and the “mobile bodies” of the universe [through] “their own natures, 
 11 
their own souls, their own intelligence.” [Ibid]   Again, pantheism seems at 
least implied here if not specifically acknowledged.  If Spinoza later 
explored in depth the theory of pantheism in the middle of the seventeenth 
century and Toland gave it its name at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, its implications were at least partly anticipated by Bruno two 
hundred years earlier.   
 
 In concluding the fifth dialogue, Bruno also linked evolution with the 
eternal aspect of nature that could be identified with God: “And here is 
nothing to which it is naturally appropriate to be eternal, except for the 
substance which is matter, to which it is no less appropriate to be in 
continuous mutation.” [p. 214] Obviously, Bruno was discussing both 
animate and inanimate evolution, but again he was applying the notion of 
eternal existence to the universe alone independent of God’s authority, 
something that many agnostics have not yet been willing to do three 
hundred years later.  
 
 Bruno’s second published Dialogue in 1584, De l’Infinito, Universo, e 
Mondi [On the Infinite Universe and Worlds, translated by Dorothea Singer—
hereafter cited as Infinito] once again declared his acceptance of heliocentric 
theory, but this time with more confidence in his explanation of the various 
issues at stake. As before, he organized his argument loosely into five 
subordinate dialogues more or less in cumulative sequence, but this time 
he was more explicit in his use of Copernicus to challenge the orthodox 
Christian assumptions about religion.  In elaborating his arguments he 
more freely quoted Lucretius, and his description of God was paradoxical 
in having restricted His cosmic identity by enlarging its conception to the 
impersonal identity of infinitude emphasized by Melissus as well as 
Lucretius.  God was rendered bigger and with greater power, but with a 
manifestation diminished to relatively harmless abstractions: 
 
As our imagination proceedeth easily to the infinite, and conceiveth 
dimensional size ever greater, and number beyond number according 
to a certain succession and “power” as it is called, so also we should 
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understand that God actually conceiveth infinite dimension and 
infinite number; and from the conception there followeth the 
possibility and convenience and opportunity which we posit, namely 
that as [his] active power is infinite, so also as a necessary result, the 
subject thereof [i.e. the universe itself] is infinite. [FN Infinito, p. 270] 
 
As in La Cena’s fifth dialogue, Bruno also depicted the underlying stuff as 
infinite matter comprising the universe as the product of what can be 
described as divine intelligence:   
 
Moreover, just as there do verily exist finite dimensional bodies, so 
also Prime Intellect  [italics added] conceiveth body and dimension; if 
he conceiveth this, he is no less conceiveth it infinite; and if he 
conceiveth it infinite and conceiveth the body infinite, then such an 
infinite body must be intelligible, and being the product of the divine 
Intelligence [italics added] it is most real; real indeed in such a sense 
that it hath a more necessary being than that which is actually 
sensible to our eyes. [Ibid] 
 
Significantly, Bruno spelled “he” with reference to God with a small “h” 
while spelling “Prime Intellect” with capital letters, thus emphasizing the 
central role of intelligence instead of patriarchal authority as featured in the 
orthodox conception of God. Later Bruno shifted his description of God to 
the abstract designation, “Prime Cause,” but in doing so he complicated 
and somewhat obfuscated his analysis by limiting God’s active power to 
the abstract tasks of (a) predetermination in light of “infinite successive 
potentiality” and (b) its combined enactment described as “potentiality 
indistinguishable from action”: 
 
Certainly the statement that infinity existeth potentially and in 
certain [conceivable] succession, but not in action, inevitably implieth 
that active power can posit the infinite in successive action, but not in 
completed action, because the infinite can never be completed; 
whence it would follow that the Prime Cause [italics added] hath not a 
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single simple active and absolute power, but hath one active power 
to which correspondeth infinite successive potentiality, and another 
to which correspondeth potentiality indistinguishable from action. [p, 
271] 
 
Quite aside from Bruno’s distinction between potential infinity and its 
enactment, his successive references to Prime Cause, Infinity, active power, 
infinite potentiality “indistinguishable from action,” and successive versus 
completed action entail the depiction of an impersonal God.  
 
 Still later Bruno took this materialistic stance to an extreme by 
capitalizing the words “Position,” “Space,” and “Void,” just as he had 
already capitalized “Prime Intellect” and “Prime Cause,” thereby even 
further abridging God’s role--not as the anthropomorphic creator of the 
universe depicted in the Bible (both angry and vindictive regarding non-
believers), but as the physical universe itself in its entirety in accord with 
pantheistic assumptions:   
 
Now if matter hath an appetite which should not exist in vain, since 
such appetite is according to nature and proceedeth from the order of 
primal nature, it followeth that Position, Space, and Void have also 
such an appetite. [Ibid] 
 
In sum, Bruno would seem to have retained his belief in God, but only by 
having revised metaphysical speculation well enough to have identified 
God as both the universe itself and its efficient cause in having produced it.  
By insisting on God’s double identity on this basis he effectively set the 
stage for the later pantheism of Spinoza and the many nineteenth century 
successors such as Emerson, Thoreau, and myriad followers who have 
more or less identified themselves as transcendentalists.   
  
 In his third and most purely philosophical publication relevant to 
Copernicus, De la causa, Principio, et Uno [The Infinite in Giordano Bruno, 
translated by Sidney Greenburg—hereafter cited as la causa], Bruno put 
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even more emphasis on the concept of a pantheistic universe. As before, 
Bruno used five dialogues as chapters, but this time with far less reference 
to Copernican astronomy.  This discrepancy deserves consideration, since 
Bruno published the two texts, la cause and Infinito, so close in sequence 
that either might have come first, and it even seems possible that portions 
of one might well have been interspersed with the other.  Then again, his 
ideas might have advanced upon themselves without a clear demarcation.  
The most likely explanation seems that Bruno might have meant la causa to 
be a strictly metaphysical treatise in response to the astronomical emphasis 
of his earlier La Cena, and finally proposed a synthesis in Infinito to provide 
a link between the two earlier books.  This is the preferred assumption 
among scholars.  However, it seems more useful here to treat la causa as the 
culminating text in his sequence, since it mostly ignores astronomy and is 
more thorough in its philosophical argument.  Simply enough, the first of 
the three books was almost entirely astronomical, the second was both 
astronomical and metaphysical, and the third was almost entirely 
metaphysical but with a variety of concepts that anticipated scientific 
advances beyond Copernican astronomy. 
 
 In la causa Bruno maintained the abstract principle that matter 
generates form, not the reverse, and that the act (i.e., applied energy) 
predominates over everything else, thereby anticipating Einstein’s famous 
equation between mass and energy as well as the modern big bang theory 
regarding the inception of the universe as an enormous eruption of sheer 
energy that will subsequently degenerate into sheer mass within one or 
more black holes throughout a cosmic history of countless centuries.  In 
accord with Lucretius, Bruno also proposed that physical degeneration (i.e. 
entropy) is merely one particular phase of universal mutation, and that 
substance that might seem variable in its manifestation but is rooted in a 
substratum (i.e. an electromagnetic field or an even more basic Higgs field) 
that is identical in all particular things.  He also proposed that the motion 
of heavenly bodies is dictated not by external forces, but by an internal 
vital force (later described by Newton as inertia, the first law of motion), 
and that a total conservation of matter occurs despite all changes of form. 
 15 
He even went so far as to maintain once again that all variations in form 
and chemistry derive from a single universal substance.  Obviously this 
notion anticipated the concept of an electro-magnetic or Higgs field as 
explained by contemporary physics since Maxwell’s equations, though 
such a possibility was hardly conceivable in the late sixteenth century.  
Gilbert, for example, only published his initial findings about electricity the 
year that Bruno was executed.  Thus Bruno may be said to have anticipated 
many aspects of modern science without having possessed the vocabulary 
and experimental data to substantiate his relatively broad explanation. 
 
 In modern scientific terms Bruno’s notion of a physical substratum 
for the soul suggested how the human mind derives from the physical 
universe much as we assume today that the brain’s intricate flow of electric 
impulses by neurons somehow derives from a more basic electro-magnetic 
energy field that suffuses the universe as a whole. Bruno also proposed 
what later became known as a hylozoistic theory of “monads” whereby all 
portions of the universe, including one’s soul, manifest the underlying 
structure of the universe as exemplified by the universal role of the 
molecule and/or biological cell as a combination of molecules.  Leibniz later 
took up the notion without delving into its biological implications, and, 
with a few appropriate modifications in nomenclature, it remains viable 
even today relevant to cellular existence intermediate between mind and 
matter, i.e. among neural processes, body cells, and the underlying 
physical universe.  However remotely, this notion anticipated today’s 
assumption that the persistent electromagnetic activity among the brain’s 
dendrites sustains consciousness—i.e. the human soul—grounded in 
molecular activity at the root of all material existence.  In the simplest 
possible terms, soul = mind = thought processes = synaptic complexity = 
intricate electrical field = one particular manifestation of the material 
universe, perhaps the most exotic of all.  
   
   As before, Bruno’s first dialogue in la causa is strictly introductory, in 
which he ironically identified himself as Filoteo (“Lover of God”), and his 
arguments become more focused in the final two dialogues, where Bruno 
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declared his basic assumptions implicit in earlier arguments.  For the 
purposes of theoretical analysis, it once again seems useful to reverse 
Bruno’s sequence, tracing his arguments backwards from his lucid 
conclusion in the fifth dialogue to his elaborate but somewhat irrelevant 
preliminary remarks in the first dialogue.  
 
 Central to his entire argument, the fifth and final dialogue repeats 
with clarity Bruno’s insistence upon the basic self-sufficient unity of the 
total universe as implied in his earlier dialogues.  His argument here, 
attributed to Parmenides, was at least as controversial as Copernican 
astronomy, since he described the universe as a paradoxical whole of 
infinite immobility (matter) paradoxically comprising mobility among its 
numberless component parts (form):  
 
The universe is, then, one, infinite, immobile.  One, I say, is the 
absolute possibility, one the act, one the form or soul, one the matter 
or body, one the thing, one the being, one the greatest and best—
which must be capable of being comprehended and, therefore, is 
without end and without limit—and in so far infinite and 
indeterminate—and consequently immobile. [p. 160] 
 
Bruno further emphasized the paradoxical interaction among form, matter, 
and soul in the composition of the universe: 
 
It [the universe] has not parts and again parts; and having no parts, it 
is not composed.  It is a term in such a way that it is not a term; it is 
form in such a way that it is not form; it is matter in such a way that it 
is not matter; it is a soul in such a way that it is not soul—because it is 
all indifferently and, in short, is one; the universe is one. [Ibid] 
 
Bruno also insisted as earlier suggested by Melissus, that “all things are in 
the universe, and the universe is in all things.”  There is no “outside” zone 
beyond this universe, which might be identified as heaven or hell--though 
he did not specifically mention this possibility to reject it.  On the other 
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hand he argued what might have seemed a technical point relevant to the 
possibility of gain or loss through change: “There is no mutation that seeks 
another being, but another mode of being.” [FN, p. 162] In other words, no 
transition from one stage of existence to the next involves any addition or 
subtraction from the universe as a whole as earlier insisted by Lucretius.  
Instead, all existence consists of behavior in pursuit of new forms, old 
substance supplanted by its reenactment in a new guise.  Darwin explained 
this biological necessity almost four centuries later relevant to advance 
from one stage to another that is presumably better able to cope with its 
circumstances.   
 
 Bruno’s unique achievement was in having extended this principle to 
the entire physical universe as compared to Aristotle’s apparent reluctance 
to explore such a possibility because he did not recognize being as one.” 
[FN, p.163] As Bruno explained, “All things are in the universe, and the 
universe is in all things,” and as a result, “There is accordingly nothing 
new under the sun.” [Ibid.]  On a spiritual basis suggestive of religion, 
Bruno even went so far as to argue, “Everything that we find in the 
universe—because it has that in itself which is all throughout all--
comprehends in its mode the whole world soul . . .” In effect, the spiritual 
and physical infinitudes do overlap, thus reducing godhood to the 
universe itself in its entirety, not that Bruno specifically declared this 
pantheistic assumption here or anywhere else in his English dialogues. 
 
 Bruno once again complicated his argument by proposing his own 
version of the “unity of opposites” first proposed by Anaximander and 
Heraclitus, the latter with his simple observation that “the way up and 
down is one and the same.”  Still later came Hegel’s elaborate formulation 
applicable to all historic process.  Crucial to this negative unity was the 
seemingly modest assumption that all reality—indeed, all experience—is 
dominated by the inevitable necessity that “one contrary is the principle of 
the other,” for example the interaction between love and hate, growth and 
decline, success and failure, civilization and its inevitable decline.  Bruno 
explained this relationship in perhaps the most basic level between the 
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antithetical principles of generation (now described as anabolism) and 
eventual corruption (now described as catabolism):  
 
Who does not see that the principle of generation and corruption is 
one? Is not the end of corruption the principle of generation . . . If we 
consider well, we see that corruption is not other than a generation, 
and the generation is not other than a corruption. [FN, pp. 171-72]   
 
More inclusively, he suggested, the inception and growth of one particular 
phenomenon depends on the corruption and destruction of others.  The 
dead rodent, for example, provides sustenance to flies, maggots, etc., which 
are themselves later devoured by birds, etc.  Bruno actually subordinated 
this inclusive dialectic to Plato’s ideal, “The highest good, the highest object 
of desire, the highest perfection, the highest beatitude, consists in the unity 
that embraces all.” [FN. p. 173]  Crucial to achieved unity are the countless 
antithetical differences that are necessarily favorable to some things, 
events, and species at the expense of others.  Most important in all 
instances, however, is their combined interaction that comprises the whole 
at every stage. 
 
 Bruno applied his version of dialectics to the dynamics of the 
material universe dependent on matter as the source for all existence.  He 
praised both Averroes and Plotinus for recognizing the essential role of 
matter in every aspect of the universe: “. . . Matter sends the forms out 
from itself, and does not receive them from without.” [FN, p. 153]  Relevant 
to this unique manifestation, he maintained, is the distinction that occurs 
between superior and inferior things strictly based on their survivable 
potential.  The superior alternative tends to be more resistant to change, he 
suggested, but its inferior alternative is more vulnerable to modification 
resulting from diversity, alteration, and movement.  Similarly, the superior 
alternative is mostly relevant to eternity, the inferior alternative to time as a 
more limited portion of eternity.  Bruno also emphasized the dichotomy 
between form and matter borrowed from Plotinus, “That which is common 
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has the function of matter, that which is proper and makes for distinction, 
that of form.” [FN, p.148-49]   
 
 Drawing upon pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, he also discussed act 
or process as the physical performance of matter at every level of 
manifestation:  
 
. . . But nature makes everything out of its matter by way of 
separation, birth, and effluxion, as the Pythagoreans understood, 
Anaxagoras and Democritus comprehended, and the sages of 
Babylonia confirmed. [FN, p. 155]  
 
Perceptible nature thus derives from matter in its growth and decline, as 
does form in its structural organization of matter.  So it is matter—the 
physical stuff of the universe, not an anthropomorphic God--that serves as 
the “divine and excellent progenitor” of the world as we know it.  Ethics 
matters (pun intended) relevant to the perpetuation of this stuff, while 
immoral transgressions somehow manifest inappropriate and ultimately 
deviation from what matters, much as Aristotle explained in Nicomachean 
Ethics.  And thus the necessity of materialism as the final and most basic 
concept of the universe:  
  
It is more appropriate to say, then, that matter contains the forms and 
implies them, than to think that it is empty of them and excludes 
them.  That matter, then, which unfolds what it has enfolded must be 
called the divine and excellent progenitor, generator and mother of 
natural things; or, in substance, the entire nature. [p. 156] 
 
Then again, the pivotal importance of process cannot be overlooked as the 
function of matter.  Its basic role becomes plain just a couple sentences 
later, when Bruno poses a rhetorical question to Aristotle, “Why, O 
Aristotle, do you not admit, that that which is the foundation and base of 
actuality, of that, I say, which is in act . . .”  [Ibid.]  It becomes apparent that 
change, action, praxis, or behavior—whatever one describes as an event or 
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happening—is also of primary importance.  Here Bruno anticipated 
Hegel’s dialectics as well as Marx’s more specific emphasis on praxis 
relevant to human behavior at all levels of manifestation (e.g. greed 
through the maximization of surplus value, revolution through the 
rejection of greed, etc.).  
 
 Then again, Bruno insisted, form is almost as important as a 
temporary product of matter through the agency of process. Relevant to 
this interaction was his explanation of mutability, age, and corruption as 
examples of matter in the act of both initiating and rejecting any particular 
form: 
 
. . . It is evident that the matter preserves the form; whence such form 
should rather desire the matter in order to perpetuate itself; because 
when separated from it, it loses its being, and not matter which has 
all that which it had before the form was found, and which can also 
have others.  Moreover, when the cause of corruption is given, it is 
not said that the form flees matter, or that it leaves matter, but rather 
that matter throws off that form, in order to take on another. [p. 158] 
 
An example of this inevitability would be the multitude of cells and 
molecules that inhabit the body of somebody who grows old and dies. 
These miniscule biological entities do not entirely disappear but instead 
play an entirely new role, thereby partaking of immortality shared with the 
physical universe itself as a whole.  Of course their identities also expire in 
life’s relentless process of adjustment, but only to transmogrify into a new 
assortment of identities.   
 
 In the final analysis, Bruno maintained, matter is not simply a passive 
medium that is configured for a variety of purposes beyond itself.  Instead, 
it itself makes the choice relevant to every form in its transition from life to 
death. Bruno actually went so far as to invoke the so-called pathetic fallacy 
by ascribing human emotions to nature with the suggestion that even 
matter itself comes to “hate” all individual forms if and when they become 
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insufficiently functional relevant to its manifestation.  In its fickleness, 
immortal matter “has in itself a loathing” for its temporary host body in its 
final stages of decline offset by “a desire” for a younger and better 
alternative. [p. 159] And of course this pursuit of renewal necessitates a 
new and more viable host body.  
  
 In his third dialogue, Bruno definitively granted soul its existence 
identified with form: “Therefore, the matter, and the substantial form of 
anything in nature—which is the soul—cannot be dissolved, or annihilated, 
completely losing their being.” [pp. 132-33]  He nevertheless insisted on the 
primary role of matter as the matrix of form and therefore soul: 
 
. . . Forms have no being without matter in which they are generated 
and corrupted and out of whose bosom they spring and into whose 
bosom they are taken back.  Therefore, matter, which always remains 
fecund and the same, must rightfully be given the prerogative of 
being recognized as the only substantial principle.” [p. 134] 
 
Bruno was able, however, to accept the relatively orthodox concept of a 
more inclusive soul as a “giver of forms” that is finally inescapable and can 
be identified with God or not: 
 
There is one intellect that gives being to everything; this is called by 
the Pythagoreans and Timaeus the giver of forms; that is the one soul 
and formal principle that becomes and informs everything; this is 
called by those aforementioned ones the fountain of forms; that there 
is one matter [i.e. the physical universe] out of which everything is 
produced and formed; this is called by all the receptacle of forms [i.e. 
the concepts and feelings relevant to its existence].  [p.135] 
 
Bruno accordingly proposed a conventional two-tier hierarchy linking soul 
(or consciousness) and matter, but quickly added a third to double the role 
of soul as both “one intellect that gives being to everything” and as 
“vivifying soul,” in other words as a source of life.  
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 In his second dialogue, Bruno once again suggested the hylozoistic 
possibility of a “world soul” whereby mind is imbedded in matter: 
 
If, then, spirit, mind, life is found in all things, and in various degrees 
fills all matter, it certainly follows that it is the true act and the true 
form of all things.  The world soul, then, is the formal constitutive 
principle of the universe, and of that which is contained in it.  I 
declare that if life is found in all things, this soul emerges as the form 
of all things—that which presides over matter, through everything . . 
. [p. 119] 
 
Not that Bruno entirely rejected the concept of God’s independent 
existence. In at least one context he treated it as a “universal intellect,” in 
effect a higher manifestation of the world soul: “The universal intellect is 
the most intimate, the most real, and the most proper faculty and partial 
power of the world soul.” [p. 112] Moreover, he even went so far as to 
identify this power as a preliminary source of authority that could be 
described as the cause of the universe:   
 
We call God first principle, inasmuch as all things are after him, 
according to a certain order of before and after, either according to 
their nature, or according to their duration, or according to their 
worthiness.  We call God first cause inasmuch as all things are 
distinct from him as the effect from the efficient [cause], the thing 
produced from the producer.  And these two points of view are 
different, because not everything [e.g. God] which is prior and more 
worthy is the cause of that which is posterior and less worthy [e.g. 
matter], and not everything that is cause is prior and more worthy 
than that which is caused, as is very clear to him who considers 
carefully. [p. 111]  
 
In this context Bruno therefore explained God on a more conventional basis 
both as a first (or “efficient”) cause and as the most important aspect of 
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nature imbedded in the universe itself. However, in doing so he also 
suggests that God’s identity  effectively consists of nature in and of itself. A 
few paragraphs later Bruno condensed his definition:  
 
I say that the universal physical efficient cause [i.e. God] is the 
universal intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the 
world soul, which is the universal form of that [the world]. [ibid] 
 
 By proposing this cause-and-effect interaction between God as the efficient 
cause of the world’s soul imbedded in the universal form of the world, 
Bruno would seem to have finally conceded the relatively simple orthodox 
concept of God’s primary function as the first cause of the universe.  
However, his paradigm also implied his even simpler assumption in his 
fifth dialogue that the universe is an infinite whole.  Of course his emphasis 
was on spatial infinity as earlier suggested by Melissus, but without 
suggesting its temporal counterpart in eternal change, the sustained agency 
of God in making this happen, thus necessitating God’s existence at least 
relevant to this purpose. Then again, if the universe has always existed, it 
was never created, and, as confirmed by Ockham’s Razor (ignored by 
Bruno in his four dialogues), there is no need for a God to have made it 
happen.  The God concept effectively becomes redundant at least to this 
extent. 
  
 Altogether, Bruno’s analysis throughout la cause was defensible in 
light of ancient metaphysics, but its implications were highly radical at the 
time—justifiable cause for concern among orthodox theologians.  Today 
the same question presents itself with big bang theory having necessitated 
a new level of speculation.  If an enormous explosion described as the big 
bang suddenly initiated the universe, as astrophysicists now consider to 
have been likely, some kind of a deity might have been involved in making 
this happen.  Then again, perhaps the big bang was merely one among 
countless big bangs in a more inclusive plenum of comparable mega-
eruptions that has always existed without any beginning or end.  
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 Specifically dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, Bruno’s fourth dialogue of 
the year was Spaccio de la bestia trionfante [The Expulsion of the Triumphant 
Beast, translated and published by Arthur Imerti]. This remarkable text 
turns out to have been an extravagant venture in allegory with a seemingly 
irrational flow of spontaneous allusions at the expense of sober analysis. To 
begin to grasp the text’s purpose, it seems necessary to be familiar with the 
previous dialogues, but in fact its insights do not seem particularly helpful 
in clarifying the content of the earlier dialogues.  
 
 What seems Bruno’s most impressive passage in this Dialogue as an 
extension of his earlier three books was his vigorous insistence on the 
overarching necessity of truth on the assumption that it partakes of “the 
unity that presides over all” through its “goodness that is pre-eminent 
among all things.” He had declared his emphasis on honesty in La Cena, at 
the very inception of his dialogues, and his holistic explanation of its 
importance was suggestive of his metaphysical assumptions in la causa.  
Nothing is more important than the truth, he argued, and anything that 
seems more important, however valid its cause, entirely subverts it: 
 
Truth is that entity which is not inferior to anything; for if you wish 
to imagine something which is before Truth, you must consider that 
thing to be other than Truth.  And if you imagine it to be other than 
Truth, you will necessarily understand it as not having truth within 
itself and, being without truth, as not being true; whence, 
consequently, it is false, it is worthless, it is nothing, it is not entity.    
[pp. 139-40] 
 
In simpler terms, any intentional fabrication given precedence over the 
truth necessarily subverts it as a valid standard of judgment.  If somebody 
belabors twenty truths, for example, in order to contextualize and thereby 
justify what might seem a harmless lie, his seemingly truthful effort itself 
becomes a matter of deception. To this extent Pontius Pilate’s apparently 
simplistic question, “What is truth?” might seem relevant, but Bruno did 
not specifically apply his absolutist insistence to the validity of religious 
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belief in this context, and he kept his assertion as abstract as possible with 
no single referent beyond his declaration, “Above all things, then, is 
Truth,” almost as if his particular god happened to be nothing more nor 
less than the truth once featured by Sophists.  Nevertheless, the linkage, 
whether justified or not, cannot be ignored between the credibility of 
religious belief and the lack thereof: 
 
Thus Truth is before all things, is with all things, is after all things, is 
above all, with all, after all; she contains the reason for the beginning, 
middle, and end.  She is before things, as cause and principle, 
inasmuch as through her, things have their dependence; she is in 
things and is herself their substance, inasmuch as through her they 
have their subsistence.  She is after all things inasmuch as through 
her they are understood without falsity.  She is ideal, natural, and 
notional; she is metaphysics, physics, and logic.  Above all things, 
then, is Truth; and that which is above all things, although it is 
conceived differently, according to another reason and otherwise 
named, nevertheless, in substance must be Truth herself. [Ibid] 
 
Bruno’s emphasis on “all things” was what might be described as a loaded 
referent given his emphasis on the physical universe.  The notion of truth 
as a universal obligation would thus seem to have emphasized the need for 
uncompromising honesty relevant to everything said.  Not that Bruno 
suggestion of God’s non-existence can also be accepted as a conceivable 
“truth,” as has been routinely asserted throughout history relevant to the 
possible existence of all competitive pagan gods.  For such a concession 
regarding the improbability of the Biblical God’s existence would have 
been both unspeakable and unthinkable at the time.  Just as important, 
however, was a second question: what if the overwhelming majority of 
humanity—the “vulgar crowd,” the “rude populace” as Bruno himself 
suggested in his previous three dialogues—was too dependent on the God 
concept to be able to abandon it?  This would have been a major issue to be 
taken under consideration, but having chosen not to ask the first question, 
Bruno seemingly had no need to answer the second.     
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 In any case the issue of the truth remained of absolute importance.  
Four centuries before Christ, Plato quoted Socrates in the simplest possible 
terms, “The discovery of the truth is a common good,” but also the mantra, 
“I do not think that I know what I do not know,” quite aside from his later 
execution for supposedly having misled the youth of Athens with false 
truths. In Laws 13, written at the very end of his life, Plato advocated the 
execution of atheists for promulgating untruths, and just a couple decades 
later Aristotle was able to assert on almost a reverential basis, “Truth is 
noble and laudable,” though it cannot be forgotten that he finally fled 
Athens to escape the martyrdom already endured by Socrates [FN Gorgias, 
505; Apology, 21d; Nichomachean Ethics, 1127a29-30] As many as three 
centuries later Christ was quoted as having promised, “And ye shall know 
the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” He also declared,  “I am the 
way of the truth, and the life”; and “To this end was I born, and for this 
cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.” 
[John 8:32; 14:6 and 18:37].   Yet Christ refused to answer Pontius Pilate’s 
simple question, “What is truth?”  Confronted with such a broad challenge 
from a Roman prefect undoubtedly versed in Greek philosophy, Christ 
chose to remain silent. Within a couple hundred miles from Athens, Rome 
and Alexandria, he had nothing to say.    
 
 As perhaps to be expected, Bruno’s cause was strikingly different 
from those of his two illustrious predecessors—Christ and Socrates.  Unlike 
Socrates, Bruno was totally confident of his knowledge; and unlike Christ, 
he insisted on making his arguments heard--even by those who sentenced 
him to death during Inquisition proceedings.  Remarkably, he even defied 
his judges to bring in their best and most knowledgeable debaters upon the 
issues relevant to his presumed guilt, and his interrogators refused to do 
this.  And what exactly was his dangerous truth not even to be submitted 
to discussion at his trial though it was the reason for his trial?  After a full 
millennium of medieval torture and executions enforced by the Inquisition 
and justified by its most brilliant minds (most notably Aquinas), Bruno 
displayed high courage verging on foolhardiness for having proposed the 
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ultimate truth of the material universe as well as a substantial reduction in 
God’s authority tantamount to non-existence except in its pantheistic 
identity as the universe itself.  Unfortunately, Bruno’s certitude cost him 
his life, as it had with both Socrates and Christ, for having perverted the 
minds of supposedly credulous followers able and willing to take into 
account his relatively sophisticated arguments. 
 
 Bruno’s martyrdom was entirely predictable.  Because of mounting 
hostility between England and France regarding Mary, Queen of Scots, 
Bruno returned to Paris in 1585.  However, his public lectures in Paris 
provoked excessive controversy, so he quickly moved on to Germany to 
lecture for two years at Wittenberg with an emphasis upon Aristotle.  Here 
again he compromised his situation by expressing his ideas in the public 
arena.  He next obtained a teaching position at Helmstedt, Germany, but 
was obliged to flee to Frankfurt after his excommunication by the Lutheran 
church in 1590, just as he had already been excommunicated by both the 
Catholic and Calvinist churches.  His two years spent in Frankfurt seem to 
have been a productive interlude similar to his experience in England, but 
the notoriety of his public lectures once again seems to have obliged his 
abrupt departure.  
 
    Bruno risked returning to Italy in 1591, and his controversial career as 
an author and lecturer finally came to an end with his imprisonment by the 
Inquisition at the ripe age of forty-three.  Giovanni Mocenigo, a young 
Venetian aristocrat, had invited him to Venice to serve as his mnemonic 
tutor, but he was shocked by his heresy and took a personal dislike to him. 
Upon the advice of his priest, Mocenigo enlisted helpers to capture Bruno 
and turn him over to the local Inquisition. During interrogation for two 
years in Venice, Bruno effectively defended himself with the somewhat 
disingenuous argument that he had resorted to his own particular version 
of the Averroist “double truth” by having exposing readers to theories he 
himself did not support except in the act of summarizing them.   
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 When he was transferred to the Roman Inquisition during the reign 
of Pope Clement VIII, Bruno unfortunately switched his strategy by 
defending the validity of his theories in light of Catholic doctrine. For 
seven years he endured interrogation by his Vatican Inquisitors based on 
numerous charges including atheism and Hermetic philosophy before he 
was sentenced to die at the stake. When his Inquisitors finally sentenced 
him, he is said to have told them that they seemed to pronounce their 
sentence “with greater fear than he received it.”  If this is what happened, 
his intended meaning was ambiguous.  On one hand he might have 
suggested that his accusers had more fear of hellfire than he did, since they 
were imposing the death sentence on him for advocating theories possibly 
compatible with orthodox Christianity. Then again, he might have implied 
his confidence that hell simply does not exist, so he himself experienced no 
dread of its final destination for presumed sinners, whatever their sins 
might consist of.  Also, he had his own theory of eternal life as he himself 
had already explained, on the assumption that nothing entirely terminates 
upon death in the material universe, and as much earlier suggested by 
Livy, if on a slightly different basis, individual death merely involves the 
return to a non-existence that preceded one’s birth in the first place.  An 
eternity of non-existence preceded life, and in turn death merely initiates 
such an eternity afterwards. 
 
 Pope Clement VIII finally ordered Bruno’s execution on February 19, 
1600, roughly when Shakespeare authored Hamlet and William Gilbert 
published his discovery of electricity.  Bruno was taken to Campo de’ Fiori 
a few hundred yards from the Vatican and burned at the stake.  His tongue 
was tied to prevent him from making any final speech before the hostile 
crowd.  At the last moment according to witnesses he was offered a crucifix 
to hold while he expired, but he turned away and appropriately died 
empty-handed.  Afterwards his ashes were scattered to the winds, thus 
ironically fulfilling his materialist concept of death.  Almost three centuries 
later, in 1889, an impressive statue of Bruno was erected at the site of his 
execution.  His picture had never been painted during his life, so his statue 
featured a cowl that obscures his face to suggest death itself as well as his 
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victimization for his obsessive commitment to the truth.  Many centuries 
later Vatican officials asked Mussolini to demolish the statue, but to his 
credit he refused.  Perhaps in retaliation, the Vatican canonized Bruno’s 
principal Inquisitor Cardinal Bellarmine in 1930, may his soul rest 
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